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Authenticated teleportation aims to certify the transmission of a quantum state through telepor-
tation, even in the presence of an adversary. This scenario can be pictured in terms of an untrusted
source distributing a Bell state between two parties who wish to verify it using some simple tests.
We propose a protocol that achieves this goal in a practical way, and analyse its performance and
security when the parties have noisy measurement devices. Further, we model a realistic experi-
mental scenario where the state is subject to noise and dephasing. We finally apply our analysis to
the verification of graph states with noisy measurement devices.
INTRODUCTION
By the quantum teleportation protocol, a sender can
transmit a quantum state to a receiver using only a
shared Bell state and classical communication [1]. Over
the years, teleportation has grown to be a fundamental
protocol in the field of quantum information, and further
it has been integrated into numerous other protocols as
an important step [2–4]. In this work, we consider au-
thenticated teleportation, where one can certify the tele-
portation procedure for sending quantum messages with-
out trusting the shared entanglement [5].
The cryptographic task of authentication is concerned
with two parties that share a private classical key, who
wish to exchange a message with the guarantee that it
has not been tampered with by an adversary that controls
their communication channel. Formulating this problem
in the quantum setting, the parties Alice and Bob may
share an insecure or imperfect quantum channel, which
they would like to use to send messages in the form of
quantum states. If they had in their possession a perfect
shared Bell state, Alice could send a quantum state to
Bob using the quantum teleportation procedure. Since
the Bell state forms a quantum channel between only Al-
ice and Bob, it follows that only Alice could have sent the
message that Bob receives, and an adversary cannot tam-
per with it during the transmission. However, in authen-
tication, the only prerequisite is that our parties share a
private classical key. A quantum authentication scheme
must then provide a way to distribute and test Bell states
before using them as a quantum channel through which
quantum messages can be sent.
Barnum et al. defined a framework for quantum au-
thentication and additionally proposed the first scheme
for authentication of quantum messages, based on error-
correcting codes, in [6]. Further work on authentication
of quantum messages has built upon this, focusing on
aspects such as proving the composability of the above
protocol [7], allowing the key to be recycled if the mes-
sage is accepted [7, 8], and even in the case where there is
some tampering by the adversary [8]. While the exponen-
tial security scaling of such protocols is highly desirable,
it comes at the cost of requiring levels of entanglement
that increase with the security parameter. In practice,
this becomes infeasible.
Our approach, on the other hand, is a simple yet prac-
tical way of achieving authenticated quantum commu-
nication. We consider an untrusted source who claims
to be creating Bell states that the parties wish to use
for teleportation. The parties then merely need to test
many separate copies of the Bell state before using one
for the teleportation procedure. In this way, the quan-
tum channel is authenticated before transmitting a mes-
sage. While such a straightforward approach adversely
affects the level of security one can expect, our focus is
on methods that are not experimentally demanding; in
fact, our scheme can be easily implemented with current
linear optical setups.
We use and extend a simple verification protocol from
[9], based on measuring stabilisers of the state, which
can be applied to more complicated situations such as
verifying graph states [10]. Rather than requiring a large
entangled state over multiple copies as in the quantum
authentication scheme of [6], our protocol simply requires
many separate copies of the state.
As we are interested in how this may be applied to
practical quantum networks, we consider the influence of
noise on our authentication procedure. We demonstrate
the tradeoff between how well our protocol works and its
likelihood of failure, in such a noisy setting.
Finally, our protocol and analysis, being formulated
in terms of measuring stabilisers, is then easily extended
to the verification of graph states in a realistic, noisy
scenario. Graph states are a family of states which act
as useful resources for quantum networks and compu-
tation, with applications including error correction [11],
fault tolerant quantum computation [12, 13], cryptogra-
phy [14, 15] and sensing [16, 17]. As such, their verifica-
tion is important and has been studied in various works
[10, 18–20]. This work analyses more deeply the effect of
noise in protocols such as that presented in [10].
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
07
00
0v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
16
 N
ov
 20
19
2QUANTUM AUTHENTICATION
We start by outlining the authentication framework of
Barnum et al. [6], which we use to discuss and define
security. A quantum authentication scheme is comprised
of a shared classical key, κ, known only to Alice and Bob
and chosen uniformly from the set of keys K, and cor-
responding operators Aκ, Bκ. Alice sends a message |ψ〉
to Bob by encoding with her operator Aκ. The output
of Bob, after decoding with his operator Bκ, is the re-
sulting message, in addition to a classical register with
basis states |ACC〉 , |REJ〉 which indicate acceptance or
rejection, respectively. Based on the definitions in [6], we
introduce the following.
Definition 1. We define the following security proper-
ties of a protocol for quantum authentication:
• Completeness: The protocol has completeness c if,
when there is no adversarial intervention, the state
accepted by Bob will be the same as that sent by
Alice up to c; that is, for all κ ∈ K,
Tr
[( |ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ |ACC〉 〈ACC| )(Bκ[Aκ(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)])] ≥ c.
(1)
• Soundness: If the adversary’s intervention is char-
acterised by O, the resulting output state on Bob’s
side after the protocol is
ρout =
1
|K|
∑
κ
Bκ
[
O[Aκ(|ψ〉 〈ψ|)]], (2)
and the projector associated with failure is given by
Pfail = (1− |ψ〉 〈ψ|)⊗ |ACC〉 〈ACC| , (3)
then, the protocol has soundness  if
Tr(Pfailρout) ≤ . (4)
In the notation of [6], a protocol is -secure if it has
completeness 1 and soundness . The completeness con-
dition is associated with an honest run of the protocol;
in such an ideal case, the protocol should work perfectly.
The soundness condition represents the failure of the pro-
tocol in the presence of an adversary, where by failure
we mean that the accepted state lies in the orthogonal
subspace to the ideal. It then tells us that, despite adver-
sarial intervention, the maximum probability of failure of
the protocol is . The smaller the , the more secure the
protocol. For example, in the authentication procedure
of [6],  decreases exponentially with an increase in the
size of the encoding, scaling as 2−S .
PROTOCOL
Before describing our protocol, let us state the commu-
nication scenario we consider. The two honest parties,
Alice and Bob, can perform local operations and mea-
surements. A source, who may be dishonest, is asked to
produce Bell states |Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) that our par-
ties wish to use for quantum teleportation. The source is
free to produce different states in each round. The mea-
surement devices of Alice and Bob are trusted, but may
be noisy. In addition, we assume an authenticated classi-
cal channel between the parties. This can be substituted
by shared random secret keys, ensuring that our model
lies in the authenticated communication setting as in [6].
Our protocol for authenticated teleportation is based
on the work of Marin and Markham in [9], where they
tackle quantum secret sharing over untrusted channels.
We will start by adapting their protocol to the scenario of
two parties wishing to authenticate their quantum chan-
nel for teleportation, and then address noise in the net-
work, finally extending our noise analysis to the certifi-
cation of graph states.
We will formulate our protocol in terms of stabilisers,
so that our analysis can be extended to other stabiliser
states in a straightforward way. For the Bell state |Φ+〉,
the stabiliser group is given by {1⊗ 1, σX ⊗ σX ,−σY ⊗
σY , σZ⊗σZ}. Measuring any of these stabilisers on |Φ+〉
will always give a +1 outcome, and further, it is the only
state for which this holds.
Based on this, we define an authenticated teleportation
scheme given in Protocol 1. This protocol protects the
parties against an untrusted source who creates a state
that is not |Φ+〉 and attempts to trick the parties into
using it for teleportation. The idea behind the protocol
is simply that by asking the source for multiple copies
of the state, and randomly choosing whether to test or
use it, the source is forced to behave honestly in order to
avoid being caught.
This corresponds to a quantum authentication scheme
as in Definition 1, where the shared random classical
key κ comprises of random strings that specify r and
the choice of stabiliser to measure in each round i 6= r.
Then, depending on this key κ, the parties apply their
corresponding operations. We will demonstrate that our
protocol fulfils the conditions of completeness and sound-
ness.
As mentioned previously, we are interested in analysing
the performance of the protocol in a realistic, noisy net-
work. We first consider how noise in Alice and Bob’s
measurement devices affects the security of the proto-
col, and further investigate the operation of the protocol
when the source provides noisy states. Along the way,
we will adapt the protocol to suit our purposes.
3Protocol 1 Authenticated teleportation
Input : Security parameter S.
Goal : Alice teleports state |ψ〉 to Bob through an
authenticated channel.
1: An untrusted source generates S copies of the Bell state,
and sends the shares of each to Alice and Bob.
2: Alice chooses a random r ∈ {1, 2, ..., S} and sends r to
Bob.
3: For all copies i 6= r, Alice randomly chooses to measure
either σX , σY , σZ on her part of the state. She tells Bob
which operator she measured, and her measurement out-
come.
4: For all copies i 6= r, Bob measures the same operator as
Alice. For each copy, if the product of their measurement
outcomes is +1 (or −1 when measuring σY ), they pass
the test, otherwise they fail.
5: If all tests on copies i 6= r were passed, the parties AC-
CEPT. Otherwise, they REJECT.
6: The parties use copy r as the entangled state to teleport
|ψ〉 to Bob.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
We first derive security bounds for Protocol 1, where
the source can supply any state in the hope of cheat-
ing. We start by assuming Alice and Bob can do perfect
measurements, and then extend this analysis to the case
where their measurement devices are noisy.
Perfect measurements
For the case of perfect measurements, we first go
through the security proof from [9], since we will be ex-
panding on this in later sections. Let Π be the projector
onto |Φ+〉, given by Π = |Φ+〉 〈Φ+|. This can be written
in terms of the stabilisers as
Π =
1
4
[1⊗1+σX ⊗σX +σZ⊗σZ +σZσX ⊗σZσX ], (5)
where from now onwards we will write −σY ⊗ σY as
σZσX ⊗ σZσX . The projector onto the +1 eigenstate
of the stabiliser σX ⊗ σX (passing the test) is given by
1⊗1+σX⊗σX
2 , and similarly for the others. Thus, the
POVM element for passing a test is
Mpass =
1
3
[1⊗ 1 + σX ⊗ σX
2
+
1⊗ 1+ σZ ⊗ σZ
2
+
1⊗ 1+ σZσX ⊗ σZσX
2
]
=
1⊗ 1 + 2Π
3
. (6)
Let us define MrACC as the POVM element that corre-
sponds to accepting. In Protocol 1, we see that all tests
on copies i 6= r must pass in order to do so. This gives
MrACC = ⊗
i 6=r
Mpassi . (7)
Theorem 1 ([9]). In the case of perfect measurements,
Protocol 1 has completeness 1 and soundness 1S .
Proof. First, in the case that the source supplies all ideal
Bell states, we show that the protocol works perfectly.
We write S copies of the ideal state as ⊗
S
Π. We can
then calculate the probability of successful authenticated
teleportation using copy r, when the source supplies all
ideal states, as
Tr
[
Πr ⊗MrACC ⊗
S
Π
]
= Tr
[
Πr ⊗
i 6=r
(1⊗ 1+ 2Π
3
)
i
Πi
]
= Tr
[
Πr ⊗
i 6=r
Πi
]
= 1. (8)
As we see, in the ideal case we will always pass the ver-
ification test, and using the perfect Bell state for tele-
portation results in a teleportation fidelity of 1. Thus,
if the source supplies ideal states, the parties can per-
form authenticated teleportation of a quantum message
perfectly.
We now consider the soundness bound. Let ρB be the
output of the protocol, which is the teleported qubit on
Bob’s side along with the classical register that indicates
whether to accept or reject the output. It is known that
the fidelity of the teleportation is at least as high as the
fidelity of the entangled state with the ideal Bell state
[21].
Let Pfail be the projector onto the orthogonal subspace
of the qubit |ψ〉 that Alice wants to teleport, given that
the teleportation is accepted. If Bob’s state ρB at the end
of the protocol belongs to this subspace, the protocol has
failed. We have
Tr(PfailρB) = Tr
[
(1− |ψ〉 〈ψ|)⊗ |ACC〉 〈ACC| ρB
]
≤ Tr
[
(1⊗ 1−Π)r ⊗ |ACC〉 〈ACC| ρrAB
]
,
(9)
where the total output state after the verification steps,
ρrAB , is given by
ρrAB =
1
S
S∑
r=1
[
paccρ
r
acc ⊗ |ACC〉 〈ACC|
+ prejρ
r
rej ⊗ |REJ〉 〈REJ |
]
, (10)
with pacc, prej denoting the probability of accepting or
rejecting, and ρracc, ρ
r
rej denoting the output states con-
ditioned on accepting or rejecting, respectively. When
4we condition on accepting, this becomes
Tr(PfailρB) ≤ Tr
[
1
S
S∑
r=1
(1⊗ 1−Π)rpaccρracc
]
. (11)
We will now denote the total state shared over all S copies
between Alice and Bob as ρ1...S . Then, the entangled
state used to teleport, which is the post-measurement
state conditioned on accepting, is given by
ρracc =
1
Tr
[
MrACCρ1...S
] Tr
i 6=r
[
MrACCρ1...S
]
=
1
pacc
Tr
i6=r
[
MrACCρ1...S
]
. (12)
This gives
Tr(PfailρB) ≤ Tr
[
1
S
S∑
r=1
(1⊗ 1−Π)r ⊗MrACCρ1...S
]
.
(13)
Denoting
Q =
1
S
S∑
r=1
(1⊗ 1−Π)r ⊗MrACC , (14)
we have
Tr(PfailρB) ≤ Tr(Qρ1...S). (15)
We can determine an upper bound on this expression,
no matter what state ρ1...S the source supplies, by com-
puting the maximum eigenvalue of Q. In Protocol 1, we
accept if all tests on copies i 6= r pass, and so in this case
Q is given by
Q =
1
S
S∑
r=1
(1⊗ 1−Π)r ⊗
i6=r
(1⊗ 1+ 2Π
3
)
i
. (16)
We know Π is an eigenprojector of 1⊗1+2Π3 . Let Π
⊥ be
the projector (1 ⊗ 1 − Π). Then, the complete set of
eigenprojectors for Q is given by
{ ⊗
k,
l 6=m
Π⊥l ⊗
S−k,
m 6=l
Πm}, (17)
where k ∈ {0, 1, ..., S} is the number of Π⊥’s in the eigen-
projector. We must then determine an expression for the
eigenvalues of Q as a function of k, S, which we will de-
note as g(k, S), from the eigenvalue equation
Q
[
⊗
k,
l 6=m
Π⊥l ⊗
S−k,
m 6=l
Πm
]
= g(k, S)
[
⊗
k,
l 6=m
Π⊥l ⊗
S−k,
m 6=l
Πm
]
. (18)
We will make use of the following:
(1⊗ 1−Π)Π = 0, (1⊗ 1−Π)Π⊥ = Π⊥,(1⊗ 1+ 2Π
3
)
Π = Π,
(1⊗ 1+ 2Π
3
)
Π⊥ =
1
3
Π⊥. (19)
By examining the action of Q on an eigenprojector with
(S − k) Π’s and k Π⊥’s, we see that the corresponding
eigenvalue is given by
g(k, S) =
k
S
(1)S−k
(1
3
)k−1
=
k
S
1
3k−1
. (20)
Here, kS is the probability of a randomly chosen eigen-
projector r belonging to the set of k Π⊥ terms (note that
if r belongs to the set of Π terms, then this does not
contribute to the eigenvalue), while the remaining terms
come from the action of MrACC on Π,Π
⊥. To determine
the soundness bound, we then find the maximum value
of g(k, S) over all k, which occurs for k = 1, giving
Tr(PfailρB) ≤ max
k
k
3k−1S
=
1
S
. (21)
This shows that the optimal cheating strategy for a dis-
honest source is to provide all copies but one as ideal Bell
states. The probability of the non-ideal copy being used
for teleportation is then 1S , representing the maximum
probability of failure of our protocol.
Let us now consider the teleportation step, given that
the parties have accepted the transmission of the qubit as
valid. We can derive an expression for the fidelity of the
teleported qubit, f = Tr(|ψ〉 〈ψ| ρBacc), in terms of this
soundness bound and the probability of acceptance:
Tr(PfailρB) = Tr
[
(1− |ψ〉 〈ψ|)⊗ |ACC〉 〈ACC| ρB
]
= Tr
[
(1− |ψ〉 〈ψ|)paccρBacc
]
= pacc(1− f). (22)
Thus, using our calculated expression for soundness in
Equation (21), we obtain the following expression for the
fidelity of the teleported qubit in Protocol 1:
f = 1− Tr(PfailρB)
pacc
≥ 1− 1
Spacc
. (23)
Noisy measurements
We now extend this to the case where we have imper-
fect, or noisy, measurements, and model the scenario by
introducing a noise parameter p ∈ [0, 1]. Let us denote
the POVM element for passing the test when we do the
noisy σX ⊗ σX measurement as
p
1⊗ 1+ σX ⊗ σX
2
+ (1− p)1⊗ 1
2
, (24)
and similarly for the other Pauli measurements σZ ⊗
σZ , σZσX ⊗ σZσX . Thus, with probability p each mea-
surement proceeds perfectly, and with probability (1−p)
5the measurement randomly gives either a ±1 outcome.
The POVM element for passing a test is then
Mpass =
(3− p)1⊗ 1+ 4pΠ
6
, (25)
and the overall POVM element for accepting in Protocol
1 is given by
MrACC = ⊗
i 6=r
( (3− p)1⊗ 1+ 4pΠ
6
)
i
. (26)
Theorem 2. In the case of noisy measurements with
noise parameter p, Protocol 1 has completeness ( 1+p2 )
S−1
and soundness max
k
k
S (
1+p
2 )
S−k( 3−p6 )
k−1, where k ∈
{0, 1, ..., S}, p ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. We will use:
(1⊗ 1−Π)Π = 0, (1⊗ 1−Π)Π⊥ = Π⊥,( (3− p)1⊗ 1 + 4pΠ
6
)
Π =
(1 + p
2
)
Π,( (3− p)1⊗ 1+ 4pΠ
6
)
Π⊥ =
(3− p
6
)
Π⊥. (27)
The probability of successful authenticated teleportation
when the source supplies ideal states is given by
Tr
[
Πr ⊗MrACC ⊗
S
Π
]
= Tr
[
Πr ⊗
i6=r
( (3− p)1⊗ 1+ 4pΠ
6
)
i
Πi
]
= Tr
[
Πr ⊗
i6=r
(1 + p
2
)
Πi
]
=
(1 + p
2
)S−1
. (28)
To calculate soundness, we replace Q in the previous
proof by substituting in Equation (14) our new expres-
sion for MrACC , giving
Q =
1
S
S∑
r=1
(1⊗1−Π)r ⊗
i 6=r
( (3− p)1⊗ 1+ 4pΠ
6
)
i
. (29)
Considering the action of Q on a general eigenprojector
with (S − k) Π’s and k Π⊥’s, we find the expression for
the corresponding eigenvalue to be
g(k, S, p) =
k
S
(1 + p
2
)S−k(3− p
6
)k−1
. (30)
Again, we must determine the maximum eigenvalue of Q
in order to bound the soundness of the protocol. This
gives
Tr(PfailρB) ≤ max
k
k
S
(1 + p
2
)S−k(3− p
6
)k−1
. (31)
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FIG. 1: Variation in soundness with noise parameter of the
measurements in Protocol 1. S = 101.
We can compute this bound numerically. In Figure 1,
we plot the maximum eigenvalue of Q for different values
of p. This seems to show that the protocol can never fail
in high noise. However, this is because our condition on
the protocol accepting the state is that every copy must
pass the test (Step 5). In high noise cases, we saw in our
discussion of completeness that the probability of each
state passing the test is low, and so it is very unlikely
that noisy measurements will allow every test to pass.
Thus, the protocol hardly ever accepts the state in high
noise, and so it hardly ever fails.
From our analysis, it is clear that the protocol does not
work well in the setting of noisy measurements. There-
fore, we consider a modification of the protocol in the
next section.
Noisy measurements with relaxed accept condition
We now consider no longer requiring each and ev-
ery copy that is tested to pass, in order to accept the
quantum message teleported using copy r. Let us de-
note the maximum number of tests that can fail as
∆ ∈ {0, 1, ..., S − 1}; this means that now, at least
S − 1 − ∆ tests must pass in order to accept. A modi-
fied version of the protocol incorporating such a failure
threshold is given in Protocol 2.
In our analysis, we must consider all possible combi-
nations of tests that are allowed to fail. The POVM ele-
ment for passing a test remains Mpass =
( (3−p)1⊗1+4pΠ
6
)
,
while for failing a test it is Mfail =
( (3+p)1⊗1−4pΠ
6
)
. We
must then determine a new expression for MrACC , which
corresponds to accepting in Protocol 2. Let us take D
to be the set of tests that are allowed to fail, such that
|D| ≤ ∆, and consider all possible choices for the copies
6Protocol 2 Authenticated teleportation with
failure threshold
Input : Security parameter S.
Goal : Alice teleports state |ψ〉 to Bob through an
authenticated channel.
1: An untrusted source generates S copies of the Bell state,
and sends the shares of each to Alice and Bob.
2: Alice chooses a random r ∈ {1, 2, ..., S} and a failure
threshold ∆ ∈ {0, 1, ..., S − 1}, and sends r,∆ to Bob.
3: For all copies i 6= r, Alice randomly chooses to measure
either σX , σY , σZ on her part of the state. She tells Bob
which operator she measured, and her measurement out-
come.
4: For all copies i 6= r, Bob measures the same operator as
Alice. For each copy, if the product of their measurement
outcomes is +1 (or −1 when measuring σY ), they pass
the test, otherwise they fail.
5: If at least S−1−∆ tests on copies i 6= r were passed, the
parties ACCEPT. Otherwise, they REJECT.
6: The parties use copy r as the entangled state to teleport
|ψ〉 to Bob.
that belong to this set. This gives
MrACC =
∑
D,
|D|≤∆
⊗
i/∈D,
i 6=r
Mpassi ⊗
i∈D,
i 6=r
Mfaili , (32)
which for our case of noisy measurements gives
MrACC =
∑
D,
|D|≤∆
⊗
i/∈D,
i 6=r
( (3− p)1⊗ 1+ 4pΠ
6
)
i
⊗
i∈D,
i6=r
( (3 + p)1⊗ 1− 4pΠ
6
)
i
. (33)
Theorem 3. In the case of noisy measurements with
noise parameter p, Protocol 2 has completeness
∆∑
x=0
S−1Cx
(1 + p
2
)S−1−x(1− p
2
)x
(34)
and soundness
max
k
k
S
∆∑
x=0
∆−x∑
y=0
S−kCx k−1Cy
(1 + p
2
)S−k−x(1− p
2
)x
×
(3− p
6
)k−1−y(3 + p
6
)y
. (35)
Proof. We will need the following:
(1⊗ 1−Π)Π = 0, (1⊗ 1−Π)Π⊥ = Π⊥,( (3− p)1⊗ 1+ 4pΠ
6
)
Π =
(1 + p
2
)
Π,( (3− p)1⊗ 1+ 4pΠ
6
)
Π⊥ =
(3− p
6
)
Π⊥,( (3 + p)1⊗ 1− 4pΠ
6
)
Π =
(1− p
2
)
Π,( (3 + p)1⊗ 1− 4pΠ
6
)
Π⊥ =
(3 + p
6
)
Π⊥. (36)
The completeness bound is given by
Tr
[
Πr ⊗MrACC ⊗
S
Π
]
= Tr
[ ∑
D,
|D|≤∆
⊗
i/∈D,
i6=r
( (3− p)1⊗ 1 + 4pΠ
6
)
i
Πi
⊗
i∈D,
i6=r
( (3 + p)1⊗ 1− 4pΠ
6
)
i
Πi
]
=
∆∑
x=0
S−1Cx
(1 + p
2
)S−1−x(1− p
2
)x
. (37)
To calculate the soundness bound, our expression for Q
from Equation (14) is given by
Q =
1
S
S∑
r=1
(1⊗ 1−Π)r
∑
D,
|D|≤∆
⊗
i/∈D,
i6=r
( (3− p)1⊗ 1 + 4pΠ
6
)
i
⊗
i∈D,
i6=r
( (3 + p)1⊗ 1− 4pΠ
6
)
i
. (38)
The eigenprojectors of Q are again given by Equation
(17). From the action of Q on an eigenprojector with
(S − k) Π terms and k Π⊥ terms, using Equation (36),
we determine the corresponding eigenvalue expression to
be
g(k, S, p,∆) =
k
S
∆∑
x=0
∆−x∑
y=0
S−kCx k−1Cy
×
(1 + p
2
)S−k−x(1− p
2
)x
×
(3− p
6
)k−1−y(3 + p
6
)y
, (39)
which leads to the soundness being the maximum of this
expression over all possible values of k. (Note that if the
parties run Protocol 2 with perfect measurement devices,
the corresponding security bounds can be determined by
substituting p = 1 in the above expressions.)
7Noise parameter of measurement devices (p)
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FIG. 2: Comparison of completeness (dashed line) and sound-
ness (solid line) bounds for different failure thresholds ∆ in
Protocol 2. S = 101.
The maximum eigenvalue of Q for a certain ∆ can be
determined numerically for various values of the noise
parameter p. We plot this, along with the completeness
bound, for different failure thresholds in Figure 2. We
see that allowing a large proportion of tests to fail of
course gives a better completeness bound, but it comes
at a cost of the protocol being more susceptible to cheat-
ing by a dishonest source. Our results demonstrate the
robustness of our protocol, by providing a quantitative
assessment of the tradeoff between how well the protocol
works, and how likely it is to fail. This is particularly
useful for an experimental implementation: for exam-
ple, if the noise parameter of the measurement devices is
known, we can use Theorem 3 to determine the appro-
priate failure threshold required to achieve our desired
tradeoff.
ANALYSIS FOR NOISY STATES
Let us now consider the scenario where, due to imper-
fections of realistic networks, the states prepared by the
source are noisy versions of the Bell state. In such a set-
ting, we are interested in analysing how noise affects the
working of the protocol: how likely it is that the final
state will be accepted, and the statements we can make
about the fidelity of teleportation in this case. We model
the scenario using states of the form
ρ = v
[
(1− η) ∣∣Φ+〉 〈Φ+∣∣+ η ∣∣Φ−〉 〈Φ−∣∣ ]+ (1− v)1⊗ 1
4
,
(40)
where v is a noise parameter and η is the dephasing noise.
Such states take into account realistic noise that may
be present when performing our protocols, and model
polarisation-entangled photon pairs that can easily be
created in the lab when performing experiments [22].
Note that when η = 0, ρ takes the form of the Werner
state [23] with visibility v.
Let us assume the measurements work perfectly for
simplicity. As we saw earlier, in this case, Mpass =
1⊗1+2Π
3 . Then, the probability of passing a test with
such a noisy state is
Tr(Mpassρ) =
3 + 3v − 4vη
6
. (41)
Let us first see how Protocol 1 works in this scenario,
where recall that MrACC = ⊗
i 6=r
Mpassi . The probability
of accepting (passing all S − 1 tests) when the source
produces noisy states is
Tr(MrACC ⊗
S
ρ) = Tr
[
ρr ⊗
i 6=r
(1⊗ 1 + 2Π
3
)
i
ρi
]
=
(3 + 3v − 4vη
6
)S−1
. (42)
We now examine the probability of acceptance with
noisy states in Protocol 2. In the case of perfect mea-
surements, we have Mfail =
21⊗1−2Π
3 . The modified
MrACC is then
MrACC =
∑
D,
|D|≤∆
⊗
i/∈D,
i 6=r
Mpassi ⊗
i∈D,
i 6=r
Mfaili
=
∑
D,
|D|≤∆
⊗
i/∈D,
i 6=r
(1⊗ 1+ 2Π
3
)
i
⊗
i∈D,
i6=r
(21⊗ 1− 2Π
3
)
i
.
(43)
We will also require the probability of failing a test with
the noisy state:
Tr(Mfailρ) =
3− 3v + 4vη
6
. (44)
Then, the acceptance probability in Protocol 2 is given
by
Tr(MrACC ⊗
S
ρ)
= Tr
[
ρr
∑
D,
|D|≤∆
⊗
i/∈D,
i 6=r
(1⊗ 1+ 2Π
3
)
i
ρi
⊗
i∈D,
i6=r
(21⊗ 1− 2Π
3
)
i
ρi
]
=
∆∑
x=0
S−1Cx
(3 + 3v − 4vη
6
)S−1−x(3− 3v + 4vη
6
)x
.
(45)
Note that for Werner states (η = 0), the above ex-
pression reduces to the completeness bound with noisy
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FIG. 3: Comparison of the variation of acceptance probability
in Protocol 2 with failure threshold ∆, for Werner states of
different visibilities v. S = 101.
measurement devices. A plot of the probability of accep-
tance in a realistic experimental implementation is given
in Figure 3, as a function of the failure threshold and
visibility. If the source creates states of higher visibility,
it is of course more likely to lead to the teleported qubit
being accepted; further, we can see how increasing the
failure threshold helps this.
Knowing the probability of acceptance when the source
provides Werner states, we can determine a lower bound
on the fidelity of teleportation in Step 6 of Protocol 2.
For this, we require the soundness bound in the case of
perfect measurements (Equation (35) with p = 1), as well
as Equation (22) for relating the soundness and proba-
bility of acceptance to the fidelity of teleportation. This
gives
f ≥ 1−
max
k
k
S
∆∑
x=0
∆−x∑
y=0
S−kCx k−1Cy(1)S−k−x(0)x
(
1
3
)k−1−y( 2
3
)y
∆∑
x=0
S−1Cx
(
1+v
2
)S−1−x( 1−v
2
)x .
(46)
We plot this in Figure 4 for different failure thresh-
olds and Werner state visibilities. For a source creating
Werner states of visibility v and allowing up to ∆ fail-
ures, our results tell us the fidelity we can certify of an
accepted transmission of a quantum message using Pro-
tocol 2. Further, by increasing the number of copies, the
probability of acceptance increases while the soundness
bound decreases, leading to a higher certified fidelity, and
approaching the actual fidelity of teleportation with the
Werner state.
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FIG. 4: Comparison of the variation of fidelity of teleportation
certified using Protocol 2 with failure threshold ∆, for Werner
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EXTENSION TO GRAPH STATE
VERIFICATION
As demonstrated by Markham and Krause in [10], the
technique of stabiliser-based verification can be naturally
extended to graph states. In Protocol 3, we give a mod-
ified version of their protocol that incorporates a failure
threshold. We will now see how a similar noise analysis
affects the security bounds in this case.
Consider an n-qubit graph state |G〉 shared between
n parties. Its full stabiliser group is given by S = {Sj},
where j = {1, ..., 2n}. Using the stabilisers for the graph
state |G〉, we can write the projector onto the graph state
as a combination of these,
Π = |G〉 〈G| = 1
2n
2n∑
j=1
Sj . (47)
The projector onto the +1 eigenstate of the stabiliser
Sj (passing the test) is given by 1+Sj2 . (Note that the
identity matrix here is of size 2n.) Let us model the
noisy Sj measurement, using POVMs as before, as
p
1+ Sj
2
+ (1− p)1
2
. (48)
9Protocol 3 Verification of graph states with
failure threshold (adapted from [10])
Input : Security parameter S.
Goal : The parties verify that they share the n-qubit graph
state |G〉.
1: An untrusted source generates S copies of the graph state,
and sends the shares of each to the parties.
2: Party 1 chooses a random r ∈ {1, 2, ..., S} and a failure
threshold ∆ ∈ {0, 1, ..., S−1}, and sends r,∆ to the other
parties.
3: For all copies i 6= r, party 1 randomly chooses a stabiliser
Sj to measure. She tells the other parties which stabiliser
she chose, and her measurement outcome.
4: For all copies i 6= r, the other parties perform their cor-
responding stabiliser measurements. For each copy, if the
product of all of the parties’ measurement outcomes is
+1, they pass the test, otherwise they fail.
5: If at least S−1−∆ tests on copies i 6= r were passed, the
parties ACCEPT. Otherwise, they REJECT.
6: The parties use copy r for their desired application.
Then, the POVM element for passing a test is
Mpass =
1
2n
2n∑
j=1
[
p
(1+ Sj
2
)
+ (1− p)1
2
]
=
1
2n
2n∑
j=1
p
1
2
+
1
2n
2n∑
j=1
p
Sj
2
+
1
2n
2n∑
j=1
(1− p)1
2
=
1
2n
p
2n1
2
+
p
2
1
2n
2n∑
j=1
Sj + 1
2n
(1− p)2
n1
2
=
1+ pΠ
2
, (49)
and the POVM element for failing a test isMfail =
1−pΠ
2 .
We now write MrACC , the overall POVM element for ac-
cepting in Protocol 3, as
MrACC =
∑
D,
|D|≤∆
⊗
i/∈D,
i6=r
Mpassi ⊗
i∈D,
i6=r
Mfaili
=
∑
D,
|D|≤∆
⊗
i/∈D,
i6=r
(1+ pΠ
2
)
i
⊗
i∈D,
i 6=r
(1− pΠ
2
)
i
. (50)
The analysis then proceeds similarly to before, with this
new MrACC . We give the most general result in the fol-
lowing Theorem, which can then be reduced to specific
cases (eg. perfect measurements, no failure threshold) by
substituting the relevant values of parameters.
Theorem 4. In the case of noisy measurements with
noise parameter p, Protocol 3 has completeness
∆∑
x=0
S−1C∆
(1 + p
2
)S−1−x(1− p
2
)x
(51)
and soundness
max
k
k
2k−1S
∆∑
x=0
∆−x∑
y=0
S−kCx k−1Cy
×
(1 + p
2
)S−k−x(1− p
2
)x
. (52)
Proof. We now have
(1−Π)Π = 0, (1−Π)Π⊥ = Π⊥,(1+ pΠ
2
)
Π =
(1 + p
2
)
Π,
(1+ pΠ
2
)
Π⊥ =
1
2
Π⊥,(1− pΠ
2
)
Π =
(1− p
2
)
Π,
(1− pΠ
2
)
Π⊥ =
1
2
Π⊥.
(53)
The completeness bound is given by
Tr
[
Πr
∑
D,
|D|≤∆
⊗
i/∈D,
i 6=r
(1 + pΠ
2
)
i
⊗
i∈D,
i 6=r
(1− pΠ
2
)
i
⊗
S
Π
]
=
∆∑
x=0
S−1C∆
(1 + p
2
)S−1−x(1− p
2
)x
. (54)
To calculate the soundness bound, from Equation (14)
our Q is now given by
Q =
1
S
S∑
r=1
(1−Π)r
∑
D,
|D|≤∆
⊗
i/∈D,
i 6=r
(1+ pΠ
2
)
i
⊗
i∈D,
i6=r
(1− pΠ
2
)
i
.
(55)
In a similar way to the previous calculations, we deter-
mine a general expression for the eigenvalues of Q as
g(k, S, p,∆) =
k
S
∆∑
x=0
∆−x∑
y=0
S−kCx k−1Cy
×
(1 + p
2
)S−k−x(1− p
2
)x(1
2
)k−1−y(1
2
)y
=
k
2k−1S
∆∑
x=0
∆−x∑
y=0
S−kCx k−1Cy
×
(1 + p
2
)S−k−x(1− p
2
)x
. (56)
The soundness bound is then given by the maximum of
this expression over all k.
10
DISCUSSION
In this work, we have analysed a simple approach to
authenticated teleportation of a quantum message in a
noisy network. We conclude by discussing the merits
and drawbacks of our work, and future perspectives.
As in [6, 9], the interaction required in our protocol
can be reduced by the parties sharing private random
classical keys that encode the stabiliser they measure in
each round, the copy r that is used for the teleportation,
and the allowed failure threshold ∆.
Comparing with previous authentication schemes for
quantum messages [6–8], our protocol, which consists
of performing stabiliser measurements on many separate
copies of the state, allows for a much easier experimen-
tal implementation. The existing schemes, on the other
hand, use stabiliser error-correcting codes, with the num-
ber of qubits of the encoded state increasing with the de-
sired security level. However, the tradeoff comes in terms
of security, where both types of schemes are -secure with
 = 1S for our protocol and scaling as 2
−S for protocols
based on [6].
We will briefly comment on the difference between
entanglement purification, used in [6], and our method
of authenticating the quantum channel in teleportation.
In entanglement purification, one starts out with many
copies of a state and applies operations to transform it
to a (fewer) number of copies of a maximally entangled
state. In the cryptographic setting we consider, an un-
trusted source is creating copies that we do not assume
anything about (notably, they may be different in each
round). This facilitates the application of our scheme to
other scenarios where an adversarial source creates un-
trusted entanglement.
To demonstrate our protocol experimentally, one sim-
ply needs to generate many copies of a state, which is
perfectly feasible with existing experimental setups. The
noise tolerance of our protocol has been illustrated in
terms of the tradeoff between the security bounds. Note
that we have only considered noise in the authentication
part of our scheme; we have assumed that the parties
can perform the teleportation perfectly once an authen-
ticated quantum channel has been established. Future
work could also incorporate noise in the teleportation
procedure itself.
Finally, we showed that our analysis for noisy mea-
surement devices can be extended to verification of graph
states shared between a network of parties. This has po-
tential applications in the multitude of ways graph states
are used across quantum information, be it for secret
sharing [14], metrology [24], or blind quantum computa-
tion [25].
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